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Introduction
The fundamental idea. . . of organized labor. . . has been the as-
sumption-a correct one, in the main-of an antagonism of interest
and of purpose between employer and employee. . . . That situation
cannot be applied to public employment.
SENATOR CHARLES THOMAS (D-Colorado) (1920)
Nothing can be gained by comparing public employment with pri-
vate employment; there can be no analogy in such a comparison.
Perez v. Board of Police Commissioners
of the City of Los Angeles (1947)
Incorporating public employees into labor history shows that a good deal
of the conventional wisdom and academic theory about unions in the
United States is either misleadingly incomplete or simply wrong. Are Amer-
ican workers too "individualistic," divided by race and ethnicity, or other-
wise culturally disinclined to organize as their European counterparts have?
From the mid-1950s to the early 1990s, union density in the private sector
declined from more than 33 percent to less than 12 percent; but in the pub-
lic sector, from the early 1960s to the early 1990s, union density rose from
less than 13 percent to nearly 40 percent. Today, about 40 percent of all
union members are public employees.l Counting those who, for example,
clean public schools as "workers" reveals an American working class quite
receptive to the labor movement.
Nor have the struggles of public employees been distinct from those of pri-
vate sector workers. From the Boston police strike of 1919 to the debacle in-
volving the Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization (PATCO) that
signaled the beginning of the employers' offensive in the Reagan era, the
fates of public and private sector unions have been intimately connected. But
the fact that public and private sector unions were strong in different eras
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has had a profound effect on the nature of the labor movement. Understand-
ing this changes the periodization of labor history, generally depicted solely
as a rise and decline of private sector unions. Taking serious notice of public
sector unions up to the 1960s also provides a clearer view of the factors that
inhibit union growth and the factors that facilitate it. Further, it demon-
strates another way in which American labor has been "exceptional." In
comparable countries, public workers have long been accorded most or all of
the same rights as private sector workers. The severe and enduring distinc-
tions between all government and all private employees in U.S. law and pol-
icy are neither natural nor inevitable. Most broadly, the history of public
sector unions alters our sense of what American labor actually was, why it
evolved as it did, what it might have been, what it is, and what it could be.
Yet even as public sector unionism has moved into the mainstream of the
labor movement, people who want to know about its past discover that it is
still at the margins of history. After John Commons gave public sector
unions a brief mention in 1913, the field has essentially ignored them. In re-
cent decades, historians of the unions and the working class have gone far
beyond the "Wisconsin school" that Commons founded, greatly expanding
the subjects they study and the theoretical tools used in their investigations.
Public workers, however, are excluded both from the new narratives and
the descriptive models of labor history. As a result, revealing comparisons
have been missed, and the pictures of "labor" and "workers" are incom-
plete to the point of inaccuracy. This trend has continued to the present
day. In an article published in 2002, Robert Shaffer bemoans the fact that
not only labor historians but historians in general have ignored public sec-
tor unions.2 It is my hope that this book will help bring public sector unions
into this historical discussion.
"Should public employees organize as trade unions?" John Commons
asked. His answer was a qualified yes, but he made distinctions between the
public and private sectors of the type that would continually haunt public
sector unions. While their organization was inevitable and could be posi-
tive, he wrote, government employees should not be allowed to strike, use
the closed shop, or exert excessive political pressure. These unions could
have posed an interesting paradox for the industrial pluralists in the Wis-
consin school. Primarily interested in how labor's larger institutions func-
tioned as a countervailing economic power, they might have wondered why
public workers, whose wages and hours of work were typically set by
statute, were organizing at all. Advocates of voluntarism, they might have
considered the implications of highly political public sector unions. They
could have explored what tactics were appropriate for public workers. But
the "old labor history" ignored these unions.3
Introduction 3
That they were ignored cannot be attributed to the size of public sector
unions in the first half of this century. Of course they were smaller and
weaker then than now: their density of organization held roughly steady at
10 to 13 percent from the late 1930s to the early 1960s. Still, by 1934 pub-
lic sector unions had grown to represent 9 percent of the nearly 3.3 million
government workers in the United States, who in turn constituted 12.7 per-
cent of all nonagricultural workers in the country.4 Historians have studied
and gleaned valuable lessons from workers in smaller, less organized indus-
tries in this period. In fact, in the early 1930s the rate of unionization in the
private sector was not much greater than that in the public sector.S And al-
though public sector unions had few, if any, statutory rights before the
1960s, the analogous dearth in the private sector before the New Deal has
not deterred historians. Nonetheless, even recent "institutional" overviews
of the labor movement examine only the private sector.6
The "new labor history" also has ignored the public sector. One trend of
this school was to study shorter-lived or smaller groups such as the Knights
of Labor and the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW). Historians found
these groups to be significant both on their own terms and as examples of
"lost alternatives" to what the labor movement became.? Public sector
unions also present an alternative to the path of the mainstream private sec-
tor unions that are typically presented as normal. Government workers
functioned under different institutional constraints from those affecting
their counterparts in the private sector, and adopted different strategies to
match. Some large public employee organizations, such as the National Ed-
ucation Association and the Fraternal Order of Police, have always been
outside the American Federation of Labor (AFL) and the Congress of In-
dustrial Organizations (CIO). Yet, in searching for other possibilities and
traditions in the nation's past, historians have not investigated what public
sector unions were doing, why their unprecedented growth took place only
in the last forty years, or what the consequences of that delay have been.
Other new labor historians emphasized "worker control." In their view,
labor's battle against management was not merely for better wages and
hours; it was also over who would have the knowledge and skills to deter-
mine the duties of workers and the operation of the facilities.8 Had these
historians looked at the public sector, they could have seen additional ex-
amples of how concerns over the daily work process had much to do with
why workers sought to organize. Although their wages and hours were
often set by law, government employees still formed unions, often to agitate
for greater worker control.
The new historians also examined workers who were not organized in
unions, and an increasing interest in women and African Americans pushed
labor history further away from its original exclusive focus on unions as in-
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stitutions. Scholars also went beyond the workplace, finding explanations
for much worker activity, and its successes and failures, in homes, commu-
nities, and culture. But these trends toward broadened scope and inclusion
have not been extended to government employees.9
Initially, the liberal to leftist approaches found in most studies of labor
history from at least the 1960s to the 1980s owed much to neo-Marxist
conceptions of class. These conceptions stressed relationships and conflicts
created by the capitalist mode of production. Such theories did not consider
public workers.1° Perhaps this omission occurred because, as some contem-
poraries noted, public sector unions did not contest the distribution of prof-
its within private businesses. Or more generally, perhaps it occurred be-
cause collective actions by public employees were thought not to be battles
against capitalists and capitalism, but rather merely disputes over how to
provide services to the public. In this view, the makeup of government could
reflect the results of the class struggle in private industry, and the govern-
ment's acts might be influential in that struggle, but the organization of gov-
ernment itself was not seen as a site of the struggle.
But class need not be understood only in these terms. A recent study de-
fines class largely on the basis of "the power and authority people have at
work." While this approach could be applied to the public sector, no histo-
rian has yet done so. E. P. Thompson has explained that "Classes arise be-
cause men and women, in determinative productive relations, identify their
antagonistic interests, and come to struggle, to think and to value in class
ways." Certainly the goods and services government provides through its
employees involve productive relations, and certainly these relations, which
involve managers and subordinates at work, create class issues.11 If histori-
ans had debated how government employees fitted into a class scheme, they
could have weighed the implications of public employers' importing man-
agement processes developed under early capitalism (Taylorist time-man-
agement techniques, for instance) and the struggle of government employ-
ees for more voice in the work process. To the extent that these historians
attributed certain conflicts in labor relations specifically to capitalism, they
might also have wondered what types of labor relations existed or could
have been possible in government employment, where at least some imper-
atives of capitalism were arguably not present. Further, historians inter-
ested in battles against capitalism could have pondered the role of public
sector unions as allies or direct participants in this contest, noting that the
prime opponents of public sector unions were typically private sector busi-
ness interests.
In the late twentieth century, some labor historians deemphasized class
analysis.12 Still, none of the postmodern approaches tries to find a place for
public workers. The "linguistic turn," which originated in the writings of
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French theorists such as Michel Foucault, has asserted that language is cen-
tral in "constructing" reality.13 This school has missed an opportunity to
show how important the constructions of "worker" and "union" have been
to public employees. Only by implicitly or explicitly excluding public work-
ers from these concepts could influential contemporaries, such as judges,
treat public sector unions as they did.
Even today, scholars and others too easily accept the idea that the public
sector does not contain "real" unions and workers. An analysis of labor
and women appeared to dismiss a steep rise in female membership in unions
because this rise occurred mostly in public sector unions-as if such unions
were not a legitimate part of American labor. Nelson Lichtenstein portrays
public employees as performing something less than authentic work. "Un-
like the blue collar working class," he writes, "public employees often sat
behind a desk. . . and kept their fingers clean." This would be news to the
police, firefighters, street cleaners, highway construction workers, janitors,
and other manual laborers in the public sector described in this book. In-
deed, to use the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Em-
ployees (AFSCME) as an example, a large majority of its members were
blue collar.14 '
In recent years, some labor historians have looked increasingly to the
state to explain labor's fortunes. This is part of a broader movement by his-
torians and political scientists to "bring the state back in" to their analysis,
stressing the interests and capacities of particular units of government in de-
termining policy. This model has been applied to the development of pri-
vate sector law. Surprisingly, though, works that stress the role of the state
in labor matters generally ignore the state as an employer of labor. Studies
have shown that the very structure of American federalism, with its myriad
layers and exceptionally strong courts, fundamentally affected labor and
labor law in the private sector. But no one has described how state structure
played out with an even greater vengeance in the public sector, although a
few scholars have noted that this void should be filled.15
Even modern labor historians who emphasize the significance of the state
ignore government workers. Melvyn Dubofsky's State and Labor in Mod-
ern America barely mentions public sector unions in a chapter covering the
period from 1947 to 1973, despite the fact that membership in such unions
jumped from just over one million in 1960 to over 3 million in 1976, ac-
counting for more than 80 percent of total union growth in that period.
Similarly, Nelson Lichtenstein's recent State of the Union, an otherwise ex-
cellent overview of labor since the New Deal, discusses public employee
unionism on only about three pages. Ira Katznelson, suggesting that labor
historians should take greater notice of the state and political theory, men-
tions neither public sector unions nor their political role.16
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Many historians studying the state and labor have singled out law as hav-
ing been especially important. Perhaps the most striking disregard of the
public sector is in the numerous works that use labor law to explain the size
and character of unions and, by extension, American politics. Karl Klare,
Christopher Tomlins, and Katherine Stone, among others, have argued that
aspects of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) have weakened labor.
Melvyn Dubofsky, conversely, sees the NLRA as a vital, unambiguous vic-
tory for unions. William Forbath and Victoria Hattam-implicitly address-
ing the "Sombart question" of why there is no socialism, or at least no
labor party, in America-attribute the voluntarism of the AFL, in good
part, to court decisions. These and other scholars have made a wide range
of claims about the ways in which labor law has had a crucial impact on
unions and politics in the United States. Yet none has addressed law in the
public sectorY
This omission is especially surprising because the public sector presents
an excellent opportunity to test claims about the effect of private sector
laws by making comparisons with unions in the United States that were not
covered by them. The NLRA, state labor relations acts, and (at least until
recently) employment laws such as the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)
have all excluded government workers. Throughout this century, the rules
of public employment have been set by a diverse assortment of state,
county, and municipal laws and regulations, state court decisions, and de-
partmental fiat. These rules have always been different from and much less
generous than private sector law. Before the 1960s, the law everywhere in
the United States prohibited strikes and almost all collective bargaining in
government employment, and courts also routinely upheld bans on union
membership. Moreover, the growth in the public sector since the 1960s oc-
curred under labor relations statutes patterned after but more restrictive
than the NLRA.18 Yet historians of labor law have never contrasted the im-
pact of these different rules on otherwise similar American workers and
unions. Nor has any scholar probed the disabling impact of public sector
labor law on the labor movement as a whole, or on American politics.
Court decisions concerning public sector labor law also help illuminate
questions of causation in legal history. What types of reasoning and other
influences caused judges to rule as they did? Private sector labor law has
long provided examples in such inquiries. The early legal realists, objecting
to the idea that law was a science that used neutral, internal rules, fre-
quently cited labor and employment law to argue that judges often simply
favored employers over employees and unions.19 The fact that judges still
strenuously objected to public sector unions even after largely coming to
terms with private sector labor raises questions that should be explored.
The "law and society" approach identified first with Willard Hurst and
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later with Lawrence Friedman agreed that politics mattered, but saw a need
to look beyond the "mandarin texts" of appe11ate court decisions and to ex-
amine the records of administrative bodies, litigants, and social trends.2O
Public sector labor law traditiona11y was created by local officials, and it
provides a rich field for this type of examination. The more recent ap-
proaches of critical legal studies, while finding that law is "biased," also
criticize" socio-economic" models and stress the independent significance
of legal forms and discourse. Labor law now is used to support claims that
law and its language "construct" reality.2l Examples from the public sector
can help scholars explore and refine such claims.
More genera11y, these differing approaches have left notions of causation
in legal history rather confused. In his first volume on American legal his-
tory, Morton Horwitz suggests that "law is autonomous to the extent ideas
are autonomous." In his second volume, he ruefu11y asks, "how does one
explain anything objectively in a world of complex, multiple causation?"
Christopher Tomlins and Andrew King, introducing a book of essays on the
history of labor law, characterize "legal forms" as "concepts" that have
"multiple avenues of realization but in practice [are] conventiona11y realized
inofficial discourse in ways that most accord with, or least depart from,
prevailing structures of power."22 Assuming this is correct, one might sti11
wonder what structures are most crucial in what contexts.
The history of public sector labor law shows that combining the tools of
a11these different schools can yield at least an example of a more precise ex-
planation of causation: judges were hostile to labor, they were constrained
by particular state structures and accompanying legal doctrines, and they
constructed the term "union" in a critica11y inaccurate manner.
In sum, none of the fields of history that one might expect to include pub-
lic sector unions has done so. Some books examine individual unions or
unions within a particular type of government employment, but few at-
tempt to link their subjects to the broader labor movement, or even to other
public sector unions. Rarely do these studies use the theoretical insights or
methodological techniques of modern labor history.23 Works in the "indus-
trial relations" style have emerged since the 1970s, but they are typica11y
present-minded and practitioner-oriented, usua11y ignoring history, state
theory, and the study of social movements. And even as of this writing,
there is no up-to-date treatise that discusses a11or even most current public
sector laws; overviews of the law that examine the rules of more than one
state are rare and often hard to find.24 Nearly fifty-five years ago, Sterling
Spero's sti11-useful Government as Employer argued that unions of govern-
ment employees had profound common bonds both with each other and
with the rest of labor, but practically no historian has made either connec-
tion since.
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This book examines public sector unions in America from the beginning
of the twentieth century to the passage of the first state collective bargaining
law in 1959 and its amendments in 1962. Chapter 1 begins with a "false
dawn": a boom of organizing by government employees from 1915 to
1919, which culminated in the AFL's embracing police unions. The horrified
reactions of employers led to bans on police affiliation with labor. Such a
ban caused the Boston police strike of 1919, cutting short this first boom.
Notably, even in this situation, involving the difficult case of police, public
and private sector employees proclaimed their common interests, just as
government officials, courts, and private employers tried to deny them. But
the crushing defeat of the strike-and the fears it caused-cast a debilitating
shadow over public sector unions for decades to come.
Chapter 2 is the first of three case studies that demonstrate the range of
strategies that public sector unions used. In 1928 the Seattle School Board
imposed a yellow-dog contract on high school teachers, forcing them to
leave the American Federation of Teachers (AFT). The teachers fought back
through both the courts and the ballot box from 1929 to 1932, with enthu-
siastic aid from the local AFL. This episode presages both the difficulties
public sector unions would have with the law, and the strategies available to
them, given that their employers were often elected officials. The results
were intriguingly ambiguous.
Chapter 3 analyzes the law of public sector labor relations through the
early 1960s. Inescapable and highly restrictive, the law was central to the
experiences of all public sector unions. This chapter explores the reasoning
of judges and explains why public sector labor law rights came so much
later and in so limited a form by comparison with rights in the private sec-
tor or rights of public sector unions in other nations. It also highlights the
impact that the failure of public sector unions to win institutional rights had
on these unions and on the labor movement as a whole.
Chapter 4 surveys what these unions did in the absence of any formal legal
rights. Reviewing the activities of the public school janitors and other service
workers of the Building Service Employees International Union (BSEIU) in
Chicago and elsewhere during the 1930s, it demonstrates that public sector
labor's strategies focused on politics, behind-the-scenes deals with officials,
lobbying, appeals to the public, and other kinds of informal activities. Public
sector locals in the BSEIU adapted to a wide variety of local contexts, en-
countering political machines and civil service systems, elected and ap-
pointed officials, and a myriad of different employing agencies.
Chapter 5 describes how the powerful, left-wing, and formerly private
sector Transport Workers Union, CIO (TWO), reacted after its main local
in New York City was converted into a public sector union in 1940, once
the city bought the subways. The TWO's political action involved mass
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protests and huge publicity campaigns, but it could not escape legal restric-
tions. Nevertheless, through both its own efforts and a gradually increasing
toleration of public sector unions, the TWU managed to win about as much
as could be won by such a union in this era.
Chapter 6 describes the events that ended this "pre-collective bargaining
era": the battles for and eventual passage of the first state statute permitting
collective bargaining in the public sector in Wisconsin in 1959 and 1962.
This law was enacted after AFSCME had struggled for more than a decade
to pass similar bills. Before achieving this victory, union advocates had to
address the entire history of objections and obstacles to public sector
unions: fears of police strikes, legal doctrines concerning government sover-
eignty, policy objections to unions bargaining with government, and oppo-
sition from conservative political leaders. The types of compromises and
debates that took place in Wisconsin have remained live issues across the
country in debates about public sector rights to this day.
This book is not a comprehensive treatment of all public sector labor.
Rather, it focuses on specific unions and events, and gives additional ex-
amples and information to support the claim that these events were signifi-
cant and representative. The chapters study a range of types of public em-
ployees: police, who perform a uniquely governmental job; the white-collar
and "professional" teachers; "unskilled" janitors, who could just as easily
have been in the private sector; transit workers, who at one time actually
were in the private sector; and road crews and other county and municipal
workers. The chapters also cross the country, span the period from before
World War I until 1962, and address both the AFL and the CIO.
To some extent, the decision as to which types of public workers to dis-
cuss and which to omit was based both on numbers and on contemporary
circumstances. Federal workers make only brief appearances in the follow-
ing pages, both because they were a distinct group, governed by different
laws and political conditions, and because in the period covered there were
fewer of them. Between the wars, civilian federal employees were only
about one-fourth of all the public workers in the United States. By contrast,
school employees (the subject of chapters 2 and 4) constituted from 33 to
50 percent of all state and local government workers, who in turn were
nearly 75 percent of all public employees. Thus, in 1940 there were just
under 4 million public workers; almost 2.9 million were employed by state
and local governments, and more than 1.1 million worked in public
schools. In the twenty-five years after World War II, government at the state
and local levels expanded at up to twice the rate of government at the fed-
erallevel. For the period covered here, workers in the protection services of
police (discussed in chapter 1) and fire were the largest category of munici-
pal employees aside from school employees. For example, in 1940 protec-
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tion service workers made up 28.2 percent of municipal employees outside
the education system. Today the highest rates of unionization in the public
sector are in local government employment (43.2 percent in 2001), with po-
lice, teachers, and firefighters leading the way.25
This book is also in part an attempt to answer Howard Kimmeldorf's call
for a "new old labor history."26 Its approach is "old" in that it studies
unions as institutions, their struggles over workplace issues, and their im-
pact on politics. It is "new" in that it focuses on locals and their members,
champions a heretofore-overlooked segment of the working class, and high-
lights the role of law and state structure. It even borrows from the linguistic
turn to suggest that the manner in which courts and others (falsely) con-
structed the concept of "union" influenced the history of labor.
The focus on the workplace stems first from a belief that the conditions of
waged labor were a central part of life for the large portion of the popula-
tion that engaged in it, and that battles over these conditions with employ-
ers profoundly influenced American society and politics. While uncovering
vital truths, too much of the new labor history has found reasons for suc-
cess or failure only within the working class itself, ignoring critical outside
factors, or, as Dubofsky puts it, "who rules whom." The state is one such
influence; employers are another.
In this respect the following analysis heeds the call of Brian Kelly (in his
fine study of race and class) to bring employers back into labor history.
Throughout history, the attitudes and powers of employers have often been
dispositive of labor struggles; they certainly were for public sector unions.
The 1980s confirmed how damaging hostile and aggressive employers can
be to labor and working people, yet historical theorizing is lagging behind. .
Studying the public sector workplace shows what a crucial role public and
private employers played in restricting the rights of public workers.27
The protagonists here are primarily members and representatives of local
unions, not leaders of international unions, the AFL, or the CIO. Samuel
Gompers appears in the background of chapter 1, and Philip Murray lends
a hand in chapter 5. But in this book the gears of history start moving when
individual police officers, high school teachers, janitors, subway workers,
highway workers, and others organize to demand more control over their
jobs, an end to arbitrary treatment and discrimination, a fair grievance sys-
tem, and better wages, hours, and conditions. Among the local protagonists
are the stoic John McInnes in Boston, the frustrated Walter Satterthwaite in
Seattle, the skillful Elizabeth Grady in Chicago, the colorful W. K. Jones in
San Antonio, the fiery Mike Quill in New York City, and the persistent and
precise John Lawton in Madison. The narrative that follows is the story of
what ordinary workers and their generally small and struggling locals did
and did not accomplish, and why.
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This book also follows the tradition in labor history of stressing com-
monalities among different groups of workers. Three recent trends have
combined to make this approach less popular. First, the new labor history
found that race, gender, and culture were often divisive. Second, postmod-
ernism cast doubts on whether any general explanatory theory, of class or
otherwise, could be applied over time and space. Finally, increased special-
ization among historians has caused researchers to focus on smaller areas.28
This trend has produced a wealth of valuable detail; but the methodology of
studying (for example) one set of workers, in one city, in a discrete period is
by its very nature likely to produce an interpretation that finds pivotal
causal factors that are specific only to those workers in that city at that
time. It is less likely to discover that their struggles (their goals and the ob-
stacles to those goals) were similar to and related to the struggles of a broad
class of people, including those living in other regions of the country and in
other decades.
Thus, contrary to previous interpretations, chapter 1 contends that the
Boston police strike was not caused primarily by ethnic and religious ten-
sions peculiar to Boston, but rather can be understood only as part of a na-
tionwide surge of public workers affiliating with the AFL and opposition to
this trend. Chapter 2 shows that ten years after these eastern, male, mostly
Irish cops unionized, a group of Seattle teachers, many of them women, or-
ganized for largely the same reasons and were opposed on the same
grounds. In both cases, political and business leaders feared that AFL affili-
ation by public employees would lead to "class domination" of the state.
The janitors in Chicago, Texas, and elsewhere (many of whom were women
and/or ethnic minorities), subway workers in New York City (including
many blacks), county and municipal workers in Wisconsin, and other gov-
ernment employees also shared goals and strategies and faced common ob-
stacles. This approach in no sense involves a rejection of culture or differ-
ence. One lesson to be learned from fine works of modern labor history in
the tradition of E. P. Thompson's The Making of the English Working Class
is that dictatorial, alienated workplaces that pay meager wages and demand
long hours offend the values of a wide variety of people and cultures, and
provoke resistance.29
It is through common obstacles and strategies that public sector labor
emerges as a coherent category. Although government workers had many of
the same complaints as those in the private sector, their unions had far
fewer legal rights, and their range of practical action was much more cir-
cumscribed. Throughout this book, a wide variety of public workers are
forced to confront the fact that they had no right to strike, to bargain, or, in
many cases, even to organize. These constraints made them turn to political
tactics.
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How well did these strategies work? This book attempts to balance two
competing notions. First, public sector unions fought hard and won victo-
ries for their members, despite limitations on their rights. While these
unions could not formally bargain, they devised methods of coming to ef-
fective "agreements" with their employers. They represented workers in
civil service and other administrative forums and pushed for the expansion
of such mechanisms. They shared information and resources. They pre-
vailed on public officials at all levels and appealed to the public. Through
activism and persuasion, they saved jobs, improved skills as well as pay and
conditions, and generally made life better for workers.
Nonetheless, the lack of rights was crippling. Public sector unions often
failed to accomplish moderate goals or even to survive, largely because of
the legal climate and the attitudes of employers. The failures are important
in their own right. Public sector labor law, and the state structure that
helped this body of law remain so restrictive, created a significant core of
highly political unions in the American labor movement, at the same time
keeping the size of this core artificially low during the decades when labor
in the private sector was largest and most powerful. This timing sheds light
on labor's strength and its very nature, up to and including the "Sombart
question."3o What if government workers had continued to organize after
1920 at the rate they had before? What if labor had contained a much
larger politically active and savvy component before, during, and directly
after the New Deal?
Analyzing the goals and tactics of public sector unions, the forces sup-
porting and opposing them, and their victories and defeats illuminates a
large but ignored segment of the working class. It also changes our under-
standing of the labor movement as a whole. Further, this history under-
scores the importance of law in determining the size and character of all
unions, with related implications for American politics. Simultaneously,
this history provides an opportunity to synthesize disparate theories about
how and why judges make decisions. It also buttresses recent scholarship
that argues that the structure of the American state itself had a major im-
pact on the development of labor, political movements, and government
policy. Finally, it shows how men and women employed by the government
organized, against considerable odds, to fight an uphill battle for dignity,
better pay and conditions, and a voice in workplace decisions. Their strug-
gle was in some ways different from the struggle of other American work-
ers. In other, more fundamental ways, the two were inseparable.
1The Boston Police Strike of 1919
[A] police officer is not an employee but a State officer. . . . The fol-
lowing rule. . . forbid[s] him. . . from coming under the direction
and dictation of any organization which represents but one element
or class of the community.
Boston Police Department General Order 110 (1919)
Leaving out a!1 the pretty theories and grandiloquent phrases about
their duty to the State, can a man. . . even live on such a wage?
Boston Labor World (1919)
When practically all of Boston's police officers went on strike in Septem-
ber 1919, they did so for reasons similar to those that have motivated other
workers then and since to do the same, but with unique consequences for
the history of American labor. Although the strikers were concerned with
wages, hours, and working conditions, it was immediately and ominously
clear that this event would be like no other job action. Even as the officers
were leaving their posts, crowds of over 1,000 gathered to attack them, vol-
unteer substitute policemen, and others. For three days following, many
denizens of the city engaged in a variety of criminal acts, including assaults,
public gambling (with attendant thefts and violence), robbery, and destruc-
tion of property. Parts of the city were frighteningly lawless. Rioters in
South Boston stoned a group of reserve park police, chanting "Kill them
alL" Later, a crowd of over 5,000 formed in Scollay Square in downtown
Boston and then went on a looting spree. Property of the unpopular rich
was targeted and damaged. On the second day of the strike, mounted
troopers confronted a crowd of around 15,000. The next day's paper re-
ported: "All Day Fight with Mob in ScoHay Square-Cavalry Useless. . . .
From 7 last night almost complete anarchy reigned. . . until early in the
morning." State guards finally intervened, firing point-blank into the
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crowds, killing 9 and wounding 23 others. Hundreds more had been injured
in the previous days. Property damage was estimated to be in the hundreds
of thousands of dollars. The Boston Herald explained that the rioting was
"suppressed by the rigorous rule of 7000 patrolling soldiers, their authority
backed by loaded rifles, fixed bayonets, [and] mounted machine guns." Os-
tensibly to prevent further violence or even a general strike, Governor
Calvin Coolidge then called out the rest of the state guard and told the fed-
eral secretaries of war and navy to be prepared to send troops. With peace
finally restored, all 1,147 strikers were fired.l
Unfortunately for public sector unions, the most searing and enduring
image of their history in the first half of the twentieth century and beyond
was the Boston police strike. The Boston strike was routinely cited by courts
and officials through the end of the 1940s. Even in later decades, opponents
of public sector unions would invoke the strike as a cautionary tale of the
evils of such unions. Labor was doubly cursed in that this event involved
police. First, the Boston debacle provided alarming evidence that strikes by
government workers were dangerous and destructive. The fact that the par-
ticular employees involved had jobs uniquely related to civic safety was
often lost in future debates, as the strike was used as precedent to support
bans and restrictions on all types of government workers. Second, the ex-
ample of police heightened the difficulty of seeing all public employees as
"workers": the type of people who should have the right to form unions.
After all, the interests of police and labor had often been opposed, and the
paramilitary structure of police departments did not seem a good fit for de-
mocratizing bodies such as unions. Thus, although the Boston police strike
was as atypical as it was dramatic, it contributed far more than any other
single event to the peculiarly American view that public sector labor rela-
tions were something entirely distinct from private sector labor relations.
Despite the fact that the Boston police strike was a central event in the his-
tory of public sector unions and thus a central event in the history of all
American labor, historians have rarely portrayed it as such. Fundamentally,
though, the events in Boston can be understood only as part of the larger
narrative of contemporary labor history. From 1916 to 1922, David Mont-
gomery explains, "workers' demands became too heady for the AFL. . . to
contain. . . and too menacing for business and the state to tOlerate." During
and directly after World War I, the union movement was growing in both the
public and private sectors. In 1919 police unions were affiliating with the
AFL at an impressive rate. That year, a new police local led the Boston strike
without express approval from the AFL. The underlying issues were com-
mon for the day: wages eroded by postwar inflation, long hours, unsanitary
conditions, a weak company union, and supervisor favoritism and reprisals.
The precipitating event of the strike was also typical: management sus-
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pended union leaders and announced it would not tolerate an AFL union.
The police strike involved over 1,100 workers, led to considerable violence
and several deaths, and achieved national notoriety, not unlike other promi-
nent labor actions of that year such as the Seattle general strike and the steel
strikes. Despite all this, the Boston strike is rarely seen for what it was: a vi-
tally important moment in the history of labor and workers. The reason that
historians generally ignore the impact on labor is almost certainly because
the strike involved public employees, specifically police.2
Police are the most difficult kind of public worker to envision as part of
labor, but one must do so in order to understand the Boston police strike.
Unionists and their advocates have traditionally been wary of police, in
good part because they often broke strikes. Analyzing the place of police in
a system of class structure can be complicated. Still, cops on the beat typi-
cally have come from working-class backgrounds, they perform rigidly dis-
ciplined wage labor, and in many other ways they share the identity of
"worker."3 Indeed, the unionization in Boston was part of a national trend
of police affiliation with the AFL, which in turn was part of a national
boom in the organizing of a broad range of public employees around World
War 1. In 1919 the AFL extended this vision of worker solidarity to police,
chartering thirty-seven locals.
Opposition to police affiliation with the labor movement caused the
Boston strike, and a central issue debated before, during, and after the
strike was whether any public employees should be allowed to organize.
Nonetheless, studies of the event have traditionally concentrated on ethnic
and political factors specific to Boston and its police department, contrast-
ing elite Republican Protestants, such as Massachusetts governor Calvin
Coolidge and his appointee Police Commissioner Edwin Curtis, with the
largely Democratic, Irish-Catholic police force and Democratic mayor
Frank Peters.4 The strike is also well known for having launched the na-
tional political career of future president Coolidge. But the cause of the
walkout was Curtis's ban on police affiliating with the AFL, and the
broader trend on which contemporaries focused was the nationwide in-
crease in public workers, including police, joining the AFL. In fact govern-
ment officials, businessmen, union leaders, and socialists all predicted that
public sector unions would shift the balance of power in all labor relations.
The AFL maintained that government employees were members of the
working class. Opponents insisted that they had nothing in common with
labor and that AFL organizing in the public sector would lead to domina-
tion of the state by union interests.
In early and mid-1919, these debates increasingly centered on police.
Would AFL police unions refuse to break strikes? Would they themselves
strike? Neither side dealt with these issues successfully. Across the country,
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government officials ordered police officers to leave the AFL, prompting nu-
merous confrontations, including the Boston strike. Labor leaders never
reconciled their support of public sector unions with the alarming possibil-
ity of a police strike. The disastrous conclusion of the Boston dispute ended
the first, false dawn of public sector unionism, and reverberated for decades.
Still, the labor movement in 1919 understood the common interests of pub-
lic and private sector workers, and historians should do the same.
Public employee unions had a history before the Boston strike. In the
United States, as well as abroad, some government workers had been union-
ized and active since at least the 1830s. Distinctions between the public and
private sectors were, however, more blurred in the nineteenth century than
in the twentieth. Government at all levels was smaller then. Organized pub-
lic employees were typically members of predominantly private sector
unions, such as skilled tradesmen working in naval yards. When unions first
appeared in the federal service in the 1830s during Andrew Jackson's presi-
dency, the government claimed no special status distinct from other em-
ployers. It did not challenge the rights of employees to unionize, demon-
strate, use political pressure, or even strike. Government opposition to the
unionization of its employees did not really begin until postal workers
began to organize in the late 1880s and 1890s. The kernel of the idea that
public workers should be treated differently (as well as the beginning of
highly adversariallabor relations in the U.S. Post Office) can be seen in an
order in 1895 by President Grover Cleveland's postmaster general, William
Wilson, which forbade any employee, on pain of removal, to visit Washing-
ton "for the purposes of influencing legislation before Congress."5
Like private sector unions, much of the activity of public sector labor in
the nineteenth century centered on hours legislation. Public workers in
Philadelphia won the ten-hour day after a major protest in June 1835. Ac-
cording to union leader John Ferral, "Each day added thousands to our
ranks. We marched to the public works, and the workmen joined in with us;
when the procession passed, employment ceased, business was at a stand-
still." Also in the 1830s, the National Trade Union (NTU) sent a request to
Congress for the ten-hour day on federal works. "We do not. . . demand
anything from the government but one's rights which have been acknowl-
edged by the generality of employers throughout the Union," the NTU
maintained. While this move brought no immediate results, in 1840 Presi-
dent Martin Van Buren signed an executive order that established the ten-
hour day for workers on federal projects. Two years later, workers in the
shipbuilding crafts began fighting for the eight-hour day. By 1854 this
workday was the standard for caulkers. In 1861 Congress passed a prevail-
ing hours and wages law for the navy.6 As these examples indicate, exactly
which workers were "public" was not always clear, as much work for the
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government was done by employees in crafts organized by private sector
umons.
The first organized municipal employees were also skilled workers in
craft unions with both public and private sector members. These early pub-
lic sector unions often attempted to act like private sector labor. As early as
1867, the National Labor Union unsuccessfuny called for the closed shop in
public employment; labor would have almost no success in bringing any
form of union security to the public sector until the late twentieth century.
Public sector unions in the nineteenth century also sought to negotiate con-
tracts. The Chicago Electricity Department signed the first known formal
agreement between a municipal agency and a labor organization in 1905.
Public sector unions sometimes used the tactics of private sector unions,
and public employers sometimes responded in kind. During strikes of street
cleaners and garbage and ash collectors in 1906 and 1911 in New York, po-
lice attacked the workers, and both strikes ended when the city imported
thousands of strikebreakers. In the second decade of the twentieth century,
public employers also began to form "employee associations"; these were
equivalent to company unions in the private sector and often included man-
agers.? Nonetheless, legitimate public sector unions organized with increas-
ing fervor.
The impetus to unionize among municipal employees in the later nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries was in part a desire to confront a grow-
ing problem in government employment: political machines and their cor-
porate allies. Generally, labor did better in the absence of machines. John
Commons reported that where government reformers were in power, local
officials would consult with labor in setting wages, hours, and working
conditions, but where machine politicians or business cliques controlled
city hall, there was hostility to unions of city workers. Therefore, Commons
called the organization of municipal employees "the most important practi-
cal contribution that has been made to civil service reform in a democratic
government." Public employers should officially recognize unions, "to give
them a part in the administration of the department and then to hold them
to that responsibility." Labor's enemies also included those who profited
from association with machine bosses. For example, the Chicago Teachers
Federation (CTF), a forerunner of the AFT, waged a long struggle against
notoriously corrupt influences in the government of Chicago. The CTF's
lawsuit in 1902 against wealthy tax evaders brought a million-dollar in-
crease in revenues to the schools and a raise for teachers.8
Public sector organizing continued in the early twentieth century, and by
January 1918 the AFL's American Federationist could proudly announce
that public employees had "come forward voluntarily in recent years in
large numbers" to join the AFL. After fitful starts in the first decade of the
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century, the movement took off around World War 1. In 1906 the AFL cre-
ated its first national union of government workers, the National Federa-
tion of Post Office Clerks. In 1902 the CTF affiliated with the Chicago
AFL, and the national AFL directly chartered a teachers' local in San Anto-
nio. After a few abortive attempts to create a national teachers' union, in
1916 the AFL formed the AFT. In the year before the Boston strike, the
AFT grew from 2,000 to 11,000 members. In 1917 the AFL established the
National Federation of Federal Employees (NFFE). That same year, the Na-
tional Association of Letter Carriers (NALC), founded in 1889, affiliated
with the AFL, as did the Railway Mail Carriers. The AFL chartered its first
firefighters' local in 1903 and created the International Association of Fire
Fighters (IAFF) in 1918. The IAFF soon grew from about 5,000 to over
20,000 members. From 1918 to 1919 alone, the number of its locals more
than tripled, from 82 to 262.9
The overall rate of unionization in the public sector reflected this activ-
ity. From 1900 to 1905, union density in government employment was less
than 2 percent, increasing to only around 3.5 percent in 1910. But from
1915 to 1921 density rose from 4.8 percent to 7.2 percent, an especially
impressive increase given that the total number of government employees
in these years grew by more than one-quarter, from 1,861,000 to
2,397,000. Thus, from 1915 to 1921 the total number of public workers
in unions nearly doubled. Given the fact that these unions lacked even
the limited ability to organize and exert economic pressure that private sec-
tor unions had won by this time, these gains are striking. Also, at least
some commentators seemed prepared to accept them as part of the broader
labor movement. Charles Beard wrote in early 1919 that if "public em-
ployees are denied the right to organize and to use coercive measures, they
must then leave their fate entirely in the hands of a benevolent legislature;
and. . . the wages and hours of many public servants are not such as to
commune a close observance that the government is always a benevolent
employer." 10
Unionists repeatedly equated the concerns of public and private sector
workers. After Postmaster General Albert Burleson argued that government
employees should not be allowed to join an "outside organization"-mean-
ing a union-the American Federationist replied that in "every kind of em-
ployment" workers needed a representative that supervisors did not control.
"Public employees must not be denied the right of organization. . . and col-
lective bargaining, and must not be limited in the exercise of their rights as
citizens." The AFL stated that it sought the same goals for government and
private sector employees: collective bargaining rights, improved wages and
hours, and an end to Taylorist management practices. Simultaneously, lead-
ers of public sector unions affirmed their links to private sector labor. "The
The Boston Police Strike 19
teachers are at last realizing that as workers their place is with the other
workers of the country, and that it is their duty to the schools to align them-
selves with the labor movement," AFT president Charles Stillman wrote.
NFFE president Ernest Greenwood credited AFL-assisted lobbying for re-
cent improvements in federal pay scales. With "millions of labor voices"
added to their appeals, Greenwood claimed, NFFE had been as effective as
a private sector union. He was optimistic enough to add that the public now
believed that government workers had the "same right to . . . bargain col-
lectively" as those in the private sector. Gilbert Hyatt of the National Fed-
eration of Postal Employees (NFPE) also cited AFL lobbying and new atti-
tudes toward public employees. "The old delusion. . . that any government
job is a sinecure, has been thoroughly exploded." He urged the government
to become as good an employer as the average private company.ll
No one factor explains the heightened interest of the AFL and public
workers in each other, but several developments in law, politics, and the
state clearly contributed.12 First, in 1912 the AFL helped pass the Lloyd-
LaFonette Act. This legislation gave federal workers the formal right to or-
ganize, spurred growth in their unions, and seemed to inspire unions of em-
ployees of local governments such as the IAFF and the AFT. Second, the
battle against political machines had led to campaigns for civil service laws
that state and local government workers joined through their unions. Third,
the war had enlarged both the size of government and the potential scope of
its activity. Total public employment leaped from 1,861,000 in 1915 to
2,461,000 in 1918.13 This trend prompted the American Federationist to
argue that public workers needed the right to organize because "govern-
ment activities are being extended into every industry," putting many work-
ers either in or potentiany in the state's employ. Indeed, by November 1918,
9 million Americans worked in war-related industries. Government involve-
ment in labor relations-most prominently through the federal War Labor
Board (WLB)-also undercut the distinction between the private and public
sectors. In addition, World War I, like World War II to fonow, helped de-
crease attacks on labor because of political and social pressure to collabo-
rate for the war effort. Scholars have focused on this phenomenon in the
private sector, describing the need for uninterrupted industrial production,
but these attitudes also affected the public sector. For example, Sterling
Spero notes that during World War I, the War Department greatly modified
its attitude toward unions of its own employees, virtually recognizing them
and practicing the "utmost cooperation." In this spirit, although the WLB
did not have authority over the public sector, it took jurisdiction in at least
one case because both parties (the city of Pittsburgh and a firefighters'
union) had consented.14
With the public sector movement in full swing, repeated requests by ordi-
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nary officers finally convinced the AFL to accept police unions. Until 1919
the AFL had refused to charter such locals. The 1897 AFL convention re-
jected an application from a police group in Cleveland, despite the endorse-
ment of the application by the Cleveland Central Labor Union and the
AFL's regional organizer. The AFL explained that it was "not within the
province of the trade union movement to specially organize policemen, no
more than to organize militiamen, as both. . . are too often controlled by
forces inimical to the labor movement." Of course relations between law en-
forcement and labor had often been adversarial, as police broke strikes and
attacked worker protests. In his 1925 autobiography, AFL president
Samuel Gompers described violent encounters with law enforcement, pro-
viding vivid details of an attack by mounted police on a crowd of union
supporters that included women and children. Even though the incident had
occurred decades earlier, Gompers wrote that "to this day I cannot think of
that wild scene without my blood surging in indignation at the brutality of
the police." In 1917, prompted by more requests from police organizations
and a request from the St. Paul, Minnesota, delegation, the AFL convention
voted to reexamine the prohibition on police locals, but in May 1918 the
AFL Executive Council (EC) let the old rule stand, stating that it was "inex-
pedient to organize policemen at the present time."15
A year later, however, faced with yet more applications from police, the
EC referred the issue to the June 1919 AFL convention, and that body re-
versed the prohibition. The resolution doing so simply stated that since po-
lice in various cities had organized and requested affiliation, the AFL would
go "on record as favoring" the organization of police unions and would
grant them charters. The response was immediate: by September 1919 the
AFL had received sixty-five requests from police organizations and had
chartered thirty-seven locals. Gompers remarked that in his thirty-six years
as AFL president, he had never seen as many applications in as short a time
from any other trade. The enthusiasm was mutual. Frank Morrison, secre-
tary of the AFL, instructed organizers to give "particular attention" to po-
lice.16
The few AFL statements on police unions attributed the change in policy
to the large number of applications, but also stressed the common status of
all public and private workersP Days before the Boston strike, Gompers
spoke to the commissioners of the District of Columbia about a rule they
had recently issued that required D.C. police officers to leave a local AFL
union they had formed. Gompers explained that despite numerous requests
over many years, the AFL had "held off" on chartering police unions. But
the "requests and applications became so wide-spread and from so many
sources" that the AFL had altered its practice. In support of this claim,
Gompers provided a list of thirty-three police locals, noting that they were
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in twenty-one states from all parts of the nation and that almost all had a
membership of 100 percent of the eligible officers.18
Moreover, Gompers portrayed police as public employees, and public
employees as workers. He compared the ban on AFL affiliation by the D.C.
commissioners to President Theodore Roosevelt's repudiated "gag order"
of 1902, which had prohibited federal workers from seeking to influence
legislation on their own behalf. Arguing that the end of war-related produc-
tion had hurt public and private workers equally, Gompers stressed that the
police officers themselves had chosen to join the AFL to combat low wages
and poor working conditions. He denounced "opposition to the attempt to
organize the policemen who seek organization." Again emphasizing that all
workers should have the right to organize, Gompers argued that if "work-
ing people. . . policemen included" had the right to join "any lawful orga-
nization" before the war, they should not be denied that right after it,19
Ominously, though, Gompers's testimony displayed the unresolved ten-
sions between the AFL's declared moderation and the radical prospect of a
police strike. He stressed that the AFL was responsible, patriotic, and law-
abiding, unlike the IWW-to which, Gompers implied with no evidence,
police might turn if they could not join the AFL. Indeed, the AFL would be
a "stabilizing influence." New members were told that the membership
"obligation" of a police local contained nothing contrary to police duties.
When pressed on the strike issue, he replied that the lloyd-LaFollette Act
barred federal employees from joining groups that imposed a duty to strike,
and this restriction had not been applied to the AFL. Also, the AFL itself
could not order strikes, and police could not join private sector affiliates
that could.
These assurances implied a distinction in the ability of public and private
workers to strike that was clearer in theory than in fact. Formally, the AFL
held that the "final remedy" for government employees was legislation, not
the withholding of labor. Yet public sector unions in the AFL had struck, as
had unaffiliated police unions in Ithaca, New York, in 1889 and Cincinnati,
Ohio, in 1918. In both cases the striking officers were immediately re-
placed, and the strikes ended quickly and with little disruption; but the issue
was not imaginary. The question was whether organization or affiliation
with labor increased the chances of strikes. Believing that it did, and fore-
shadowing the battle in Boston, the mayor of Cincinnati had forbidden po-
lice officers to join the AFL after they had voted to do so.
Thus, while Gompers asserted that the police unions in the AFL would
bring greater stability, and while no AFL police union had struck, when
Gompers proclaimed that police wanted the "great mass of four million
workers" to support them, nothing in his testimony indicated exactly what
that support could involve.2O Such ambiguities would be devastating in
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Boston, where labor leaders would have to confront the contradiction im-
plicit in Gompers's position: insisting that public workers had the same
rights as private sector workers, even while worrying that strikes by at least
certain public employees-notably police-would lead labor into a deeply
damaging confrontation in which labor's demands would be opposed to the
public interest.
In addition to fears that police themselves would strike, union opponents
were also extremely concerned about how police officers in the AFL might
act during strikes by other unions. The D.C. commissioners claimed that
they welcomed unaffiliated police organizations but had barred AFL or-
ganizing to assure the "independence" of the department. They spoke of
"divided loyalty" and "charges of favoritism" if police officers who were
members of an AFL union were called on to handle strikes by members of
other AFL unions. This was a concern voiced later in Boston and elsewhere,
often by private sector business interests. Ironically, this concern seemed to
assume a greater set of common interests among public and private sector
workers than that side of the debate would normally admit. Gompers par-
ried that the AFL merely wanted the police to be neutral and "not throw
their full weight" against workers. Unconvinced, the D.C. commissioners
suggested that AFL-affiliated police would attack strikebreakers, and in-
sisted that the ban on affiliation was needed to prevent "even the charge of
partiality."21
Although the AFL never boasted of any advantages that affiliated police
unions would bring to labor, it probably saw some. The behavior of local
police was often critical to strikes and pickets, so much so that some union-
ists had joined police reform movements. Just months before the AFL re-
versed its policy on police unions, IAFF president Thomas Spellacy had re-
ported to the AFL's EC that the mayor of Colorado Springs, Colorado, had
threatened to destroy the local firefighters' union by locking out its mem-
bers and using police to replace them. Spellacy added that several police of-
ficers had told him that they would not act as strikebreakers if they were or-
ganized. The AFL never publicly discussed such considerations, but labor's
advocates on the left were less discreet. In July 1919 the socialist New York
Call announced that it viewed "policemen on the beat as members of the
working class" who would soon be "solidly lined up beside the rest of the
country's wage earners." Days before the Boston strike, the Call predicted
that unionized police might not evict tenants or attack strikers, and that
someday even soldiers might unionize. "In that day strikes might not be
necessary," the paper prophesied, and "the worker could and would be law-
ful in his enterprise for the simple reason that he would be the law."22
Such visions may have contributed to a spate of nationwide attacks on
police unions by local government employers before the Boston strike. In
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Portland, Oregon, mayor George Baker fought unionization, claiming that
it would cause divided loyalty in labor disputes. Portland police officers
countered that joining the AFL would help them understand the views of
workers. Los Angeles mayor Frederick Woodman raised wages and formed
a police relief association to impede union organization. Officials in Terre
Haute, Indiana, and Norfolk, Virginia, ordered police officers to leave the
AFL or resign; Norfolk's director of public safety threatened to use soldiers
to patrol the city if the officers refused both options. Typifying much opin-
ion in Congress, Senator H. L. Myers, a Republican from Montana, pro-
posed that police officers in the District of Columbia who had joined a
union be denied pay. In Jersey City, New Jersey, Mayor Frank Hague pro-
hibited police from joining the AFL, alleging it was "subversive of disci-
pline." In Detroit the police commissioner ordered the dismissal of all 400
members of a police association: "As long as our organization often has to
be the fence between employers and strikers, it must be neutral and it cer-
tainly could not be that and have union affiliation." Officials in Lynn, Mas-
sachusetts, barred "allegiance of any nature" by police to any group which
required "a greater loyalty" than that owed to the government. "If the cap
fits the American Federation of Labor," Lynn mayor Walter Creamer added,
"it can wear it."23
In no sense, however, were these attacks limited to police unions. Public
and private employers opposed other public sector unions as well, focusing
on those affiliated with the AFL. Ironically, in the 1919 AFL convention
proceedings, the entry after the resolution authorizing police unions stated
that all the members of a firefighters' local in Cincinnati had been fired to
discourage affiliation with the IAFF. In 1918 and 1919 resistance to the
IAFF prompted seven strikes in the United States and Canada. As chapters
2 and 3 show, many school boards in this period prohibited teachers from
joining the AFT; teachers responded with political campaigns and lawsuits.
All types of public employee unions came under attack. In August 1919 for-
mer Massachusetts attorney general Albert Pillsbury offered legislation that
would have made it illegal for any government worker in the state to join a
union. "Every. . . public service is now being conducted at the sufferance of
organized labor," he complained.24
The leaders of the AFL (all from private sector unions) tried to resist these
attacks, as did local AFL bodies and the police officer members themselves.
The EC advised police that they had the right to organize, and the labor
press across the country supported police unions. The New Jersey Central
Labor Union declared it would fight for the Jersey City police local. The
District of Columbia police local won a temporary restraining order that
blocked the commissioners' ban on AFL affiliation on the grounds that the
rule was not "needful" and the commissioners' authority extended only to
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"needful" rules. (The Boston police union would later unsuccessfully make
a similar claim.) President Woodrow Wilson then asked that the D.C. case
be held in abeyance and resolved at an upcoming general labor conference.
In the wake of the Boston strike, Congress settled the issue with laws bar-
ring strikes and AFL affiliation by police in the District of Columbia.25
The Boston Police Union was born in August 1919, amid the increasing
controversy over AFL police unions, but also amid increased militancy by
public workers in that city. In August 1918 the Boston Firefighters Union, a
charter IAFF local, won raises after threatening to resign en masse. In Au-
gust 1919 hundreds of city engineers and stationary firemen threatened to
strike unless they received raises. The Boston Central Labor Union (BCLU)
and its newspaper, the Boston Labor World, consistently supported public
sector unions generally and the police union specifically. In August 1919 the
BCLU, which was dominated by private sector unionists, warned Boston
mayor Frank Peters that it supported the demands of city workers. The
BCLU also backed the wage requests of an NFPE local; the Labor World
claimed that the board of health would close a private business that was in
as poor a condition as the main post office. The Labor World also champi-
oned the AFT locally and nationally. Generally, the BCLU welcomed the
new Boston Police Union and cheered rumblings of police organizing in
other Massachusetts cities such as Wellesley and New Bedford.26
Massachusetts and Boston had even faced public sector strikes before.
Workers struck over Taylorist management methods in the Watertown arse-
nal in 1911 and in the Charlestown navy yard in 1914. Moth workers (ex-
terminators) struck at least four times in Massachusetts between 1907 and
1917, and grave diggers in Milford struck in 1913. The Watertown workers
went out again in 1918. Boston carpenters struck army and navy worksites
in 1918. Garbage and ash collectors walked out in Springfield in 1917, in
Lawrence and Lowell in 1918, and in Newburyport in 1917, 1918, and
1919 (the workers suffered defeats in all but the first action). The Fall River
City Employees Union won pay hikes after striking in July 1919. On a
larger scale, in April 1919, 20,000 employees of New England Telephone
and Telegraph, then under government control, waged a six-day illegal
strike and gained significant raises. But like the national AFL, the BCLU
was concerned about the consequences of public sector strikes, and thus
seemed to equivocate on this issue. Former BCLU president Edward Mc-
Grady told a meeting of over 2,000 postal workers that the AFL did not
want them to strike "except as a last resort." Indeed, the BCLU was often
cautious about strikes of all kinds, reproaching employees of the Bay Street
Rail Company for threatening to stop work over dissatisfaction with a WLB
award.27
In contrast to labor's approach, leaders of the Boston Police Department
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distinguished their employees from other workers. The conflict began in
1918 when Police Commissioner Steven O'Meara learned that Boston po-
lice officers were considering AFL affiliation. O'Meara issued an order stat-
ing that even rumors of unionization were "likely to injure the discipline, ef-
ficiency and even the good name of the Force." If officers had obligations to
an outside organization, he stated, they would be "justly suspected of aban-
doning their impartial attitude." He claimed that he did not dispute the
"wisdom or even necessity" of unions in the private sector. Public sector
unions, however, were "of doubtful propriety," and police in particular
should not be allowed to organize because they were responsible for impar-
tiallaw enforcement. On July 29, 1919, in response to more talk of affilia-
tion, the new police commissioner, Edwin Curtis, promulgated Rule 102,
which stated that Curtis was "firmly of the opinion that a police officer can-
not consistently belong to a union and perform his sworn duty," and that a
police officer "should realize that his work is sharply differentiated from
that of the worker in private employ."28
Undeterred, police in Boston affiliated with the AFL on August 9, 1919.
Their complaints were typical of all workers: low wages, long hours, un-
healthy conditions, and despotic supervisors. Police had been voted a raise
in 1898 that was not put into effect until 1913. Over this period, the cost of
living had doubled. After that, pay had remained at the 1913 level until a
small increase was granted in the spring of 1919. At the time of the strike,
officers in their second to fifth years earned $1,200 a year; the most any of-
ficer could earn was $1,400; and officers had to buy their own uniforms,
which cost over $200. "Leaving out all the pretty theories and grandilo-
quent phrases about their duty to the State," the Labor World reasoned,
"can a man. . . even live on such a wage? No, he manages to exist, that is
all." Officers worked regular weeks of seventy-three hours (day shift),
eighty-three hours (night shift), and up to ninety-eight hours for some as-
signments. They were sometimes required to remain on duty seventeen
hours in a single day. Supervisors also limited where they could go on their
days off. "Such men are deprived of enjoying the comforts of their home
and family," Boston Police Union president John McInnes insisted. Station
houses were so unsanitary that the men frequently found vermin on their
clothes when they went home. "If the board of health made an investigation
as they do in the case of private houses and stores. . . there would be court
prosecutions," McInnes lamented. He also complained of many indignities
caused by authoritarian management, such as supervisors' requiring their
subordinates to run menial errands unrelated to work.29
Patrolmen had received little help from the Boston Social Club, a company
union that Police Commissioner O'Meara had organized thirteen years ear-
lier. McInnes called it a "weak-kneed organization, controlled by police offi-
